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The Availability of Statutory Damages under TILA to Remedy
the Sharp Practice of Payday Lenders
One day in 2001, Lisa Timbers found herself in a common
predicament when she was in need of immediate funds.' She
decided to obtain a "payday" loan for the $300 she needed.:
Under the terms of the agreement, Lisa, a twenty-three year-old
gas station cashier, wrote a post-dated check that would not be
cashed by the lender until she got her paycheck.3 Like many
consumers in need of quick cash and without any meaningful
alternatives, "she was unfazed by the harsh terms: The principal,
plus $51, had to be repaid in two weeks, for a[n] ... annualized
interest rate of 443%. ' '4 Unfortunately, the terms Ms. Timbers
encountered are far from extraordinary in the payday lending
industry.5 In fact, the annualized interest rate she was charged in
the form of a fee was actually slightly below the average rate
charged by payday lenders.6 To find relief from these sharp
practices, consumers like Ms. Timbers have turned to the courts by
filing suits against payday lenders for violations of certain
disclosure requirements of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA).7
Additional regulations have been promulgated under TILA to
address payday lending practices,8 but consumers have had mixed
results in obtaining statutory damages.9 Courts have not reached a
1. Paul Beckett, Risky Business: Exploiting a Loophole, Banks Skirt Stock Lows




5. John Hackett, Ethically Tainted, U.S. BANKER, Nov. 2001, at 48.
6. Id. Consumer advocacy groups estimate the average annualized interest rate
for a payday loan at 474%. Id.
7. Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667 (2001).
8. 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(14) cmt. 2 (2000). A recent comment added by the
Federal Reserve Board indicates that payday loans are to be considered credit under
the Truth in Lending Act. Id.; Elizabeth C. Yen, Wingrove S. Lynton & Timothy P.
Meredith, Truth in Lending in the Year 2000, Bus. LAW., May 2001, at 1089, 1090.
9. See Brown v. Payday Check Advance, Inc., 202 F.3d 987 (7th Cir. 2000)
(holding that statutory damages are only available for violations of certain
enumerated provisions of the Truth in Lending Act). But see Lozada v. Dale Baker
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consensus on the availability of statutory damages for violations of
TILA disclosure requirements for payday lenders, thus leaving
consumers in a difficult position when attempting to find relief
from the extreme terms of the average payday loan."°
This Note focuses on the split between the courts on the
availability of statutory damages to plaintiffs claiming that a
payday lender has violated TILA's disclosure requirements. Part I
of this Note provides an overview of payday lending and discusses
the quick growth of the industry." It also discusses the effect of
payday lending practices on consumers and counterarguments
made by the lenders. 2 Part II explains the effect of TILA on
payday lenders and how the difference between statutory and
actual damages can frustrate a plaintiff's attempt to secure a
remedy.' 3 Part III examines the split among the courts on the issue
of which disclosure violations result in automatic statutory
damages. 4 Part III also gives an overview of pertinent statutes as
well as cases that describe the competing viewpoints on statutory
damages under TILA. 15 Part IV concludes that Congress should
provide more protection to consumers obtaining payday loans.
6
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO PAYDAY LENDING
A. An Overview of the Concept of Payday Lending and the
Growth of the Industry
Payday lending is becoming an increasingly important and
controversial part of the financial landscape of the United States. 7
It has grown into an industry that exceeds $2 billion in annual
Oldsmobile, Inc., 145 F. Supp. 2d 878 (W.D. Mich. 2001) (holding that statutory
damages are widely available under TILA).
10. See infra notes 54-63 and accompanying text for a discussion of the different
types of damages available under TILA.
11. See infra notes 17-36 and accompanying text.
12. Id.
13. See infra notes 37-63 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 64-98 and accompanying text.
15. Id.
16. See infra notes 99-106 and accompanying text.
17. Ann Hayes Peterson, Payday Loans, CREDIT UNION MAG., Dec. 2000, at 56.
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revenues 18 with over $14 billion in loans made to over eight million
people.19 Despite its quick growth,2 ° many people are not aware of
the term "payday" loan.21 Ann Hayes Peterson offers a succinct
description of the typical transaction:
Payday loans are short-term transactions in which
customers borrow against their paychecks by
postdating personal checks in exchange for cash -
and service charges. Say, for example, you need
$100. You write a check to a payday lender for $115
and you get $100 in cash right away. Two weeks
later, the payday lender cashes your $115 check.
Most payday lenders make the bulk of their money
through rolling over loans, though. And consumers
tend to roll over loans about seven times, consumer
2groups say.
Despite a fee ranging from $15 to $50 for the initial loan that
usually has a term of two weeks, a consumer can be hurt by
extending the loan when it expires, thus paying that same fee each
time an extension is made. 23
B. The Effects of Payday Loans on Consumers
The rollover of payday loans is the part of the payday
lending industry that most outrages consumer advocates and other
critics of payday lending.24 By treating the fee charged to a
borrower as interest on the loan, the annual percentage rate on
payday loans averages 474%. Jean Ann Fox, director of
18. Id.
19. Beckett, supra note 1, at Al.
20. Id. Payday lending was virtually non-existent as recently as the early 1990s.
Id.
21. Peterson, supra note 17, at 56. Even professionals in the financial industries
often require an explanation of how payday lending works. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. Some loans do have longer terms. Id. There is much variation in the
industry with regards to the length, amount and interest rate of the loans. Id.
24. Hackett, supra note 5, at 48.
25. Id.
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consumer protection at the Consumer Federation of America, has
been particularly vocal in opposing this practice: "'Payday loans
are a transfer of wealth from the poor... to the predatory and the
powerful."
26
The payday lending industry defends itself from its critics in
several ways. First, industry supporters argue that payday loans
carry a high risk of default that must be compensated by the high
fees.27 However, consumer advocacy groups estimate that losses
for payday lenders are in line with what a typical bank encounters
on unsecured loans.28 The lenders also claim that they are serving
consumers with urgent needs for cash and no other options.29
While payday lenders vehemently argue that they do not target the
poor,30 it seems that low-income consumers would be more likely
to require the services of payday lenders.3 Therefore, it can be
argued that payday lenders intend to trap these consumers into
continuously rolling over their payday loans.32
In response, payday lenders argue that alternatives such as
bounced check fees are usually more expensive than a payday
loan.33 Billy Webster, president of the Community Financial
Services Association of America (CFSA), payday lending's
industry trade group, asserts that "'the average bounced check
costs $60 in fees."'34 Webster goes on to point out that banks
charge "'$7 billion a year for bounced checks"' while "payday
lenders are assailed for collecting $1.6 billion in fees a year., 35 The
26. Michael W. Lynch, Legal Loan Sharking or Essential Service? The Great
"Payday" Loan Controversy, REASON, Apr. 2002, at 38.
27. Helping Consumers Skirt Scams, TRIAL, Apr. 2002, at 58, 60.
28. Hackett, supra note 5, at 48.
29. Peterson , supra note 17, at 56.
30. Id.
31. Helping Consumers Skirt Scams, supra note 27, at 60.
32. Charles A. Bruch, Taking the Pay out of Payday Loans: Putting an End to the
Usurious and Unconscionable Interest Rates Charged by Payday Lenders, 69 U. CIN.
L. REV. 1257, 1257 (2001) (describing the story of Patricia Turner who was forced
into bankruptcy due to rolling over a payday loan); Peterson, supra note 17, at 56.
Rolling over payday loans is one way payday lenders make money. Id. Each time a
loan is rolled over, an additional fee is charged to the consumer. Id. A low-income
consumer can get to the point where bankruptcy must be declared to escape the
cycle. Id.





banking industry has responded "that bounced check fees differ
from payday loan activity in that the bounced check cost is a one-
time occurrence, not a first step in an expensive financial
entanglement.
36
II. PAYDAY LENDING AND THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE
TRUTH IN LENDING ACT
A. Payday Lenders are Subject to the Requirements of the
Truth in Lending Act
The Truth in Lending Act came into existence in 1968 to
provide a remedy for consumers injured by lenders.37 More
specifically, TILA was passed to "standardize the mechanism for
communicating the terms of consumer credit agreements, which in
turn serves to advise borrowers of the cost of credit."38 If a lender
violates the disclosure requirements established by TILA, the Act
provides remedies to consumers in the form of statutory and actual
damages.39
Payday lenders commonly claim that they are not subject to
the disclosure requirements of TILA because they are not
involved in providing credit.4° The lenders argue that they are
merely providing a service for a set fee and should not have to
comply with TILA, which governs extensions of credit.41 However,
the Federal Reserve Board recently added a comment to TILA's
regulations that unequivocally states that payday lending is to be
considered an extension of credit subject to the requirements of
TILA.42 Courts have also universally rejected the idea that payday
loans should not be considered credit just because the interest
charged is couched in terms of a fee.43 Therefore, courts consider
36. Hackett, supra note 5, at 48.
37. Kilbourn v. Candy Ford-Mercury, Inc., 209 F.R.D. 121 (W.D. Mich. 2002).
38. Bruch, supra note 32, at 1262.
39. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(1)-(2) (2001).
40. Peterson, supra note 17, at 56.
41. Id.
42. Official Staff Commentary, 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, Supp. I, § 226.2(a)(14) cmt. 2
(2000); Yen, Lynton & Meredith, supra note 8, at 1090.
43. See, e.g., Brown v. Payday Check Advance, Inc., 202 F.3d 987, 998 (7th Cir.
2000).
3432003]
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payday lenders to be subject to the disclosure requirements of
TILA.44
B. Disclosure Requirements of TILA and Payday Lending
Payday loans are classified as "closed-end" credit, " a type
of loan that requires a single payment or succession of payments
(also known as a "installment" loan).46  Like other closed-end
loans, payday loans are subject to the disclosure requirements of
section 1638 of TILA.47 Consumers who have been injured by
payday lenders have sued, often in class actions, alleging violations
of these disclosure requirements.48 Since the requirements can be
violated by very small deviations, payday lenders often violate
them or do not attempt to follow them at all.49
The disclosure requirements of TILA are indeed
exceedingly specific. In an attempt to give complete protection to
consumers, a violation can be found for missteps such as using the
wrong typeface for a financing term,5" or for failing to provide a
document at the proper time during a transaction. Consumers
have utilized the ease with which TILA can be violated to bring
suits against payday lenders who run afoul of the disclosure
requirements." Therefore, consumers can attempt to recover
damages for the high rates of interest charged by payday lenders
44. Id.
45. See Eugene J. Kelley & John L. Ropiequet, Actual Damages under the TILA:
Collapsing Class Actions, CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 200, 201 (2001).
46. See generally Hackett, supra note 5, at 48. Although payday loans are treated
as a single-payment loan for statutory purposes, the effect of repeatedly rolling over
the loan into a new loan can turn the payday loan into a long-term arrangement that
becomes more like a revolving line of credit. See id. at 50. If treated as such,
different provisions of TILA would apply to a payday loan. Truth in Lending Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1638 (2001).
47. 15 U.S.C. § 1638(b); Kelley & Ropiequet, supra note 45, at 201.
48. See, e.g., Payday Check Advance, Inc., 202 F.3d at 989.
49. Peterson, supra note 17, at 56 (describing how payday lenders do not follow
TILA because they believe it does not apply to their business practices).
50. Payday Check Advance, Inc., 202 F.3d at 990.
51. Kilbourn v. Candy Ford-Mercury, Inc., 209 F.R.D. 121 (W.D. Mich. 2002).
52. See, e.g., Payday Check Advance, Inc., 202 F.3d at 989-90.
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through the indirect means of statutory damages for violations of
disclosure requirements. 3
C. Statutory versus Actual Damages under TILA
When attempting to recover for a violation of TILA, a
borrower has the option of claiming actual or statutory damages.54
Statutory damages are automatically available under TILA once a
violation has been established without regard to whether an actual
injury has been suffered.5 Statutory damages amount to twice the
finance charge imposed by the lender in the particular
transaction.56 Since a violation will be plain on the face of the
document, statutory damages will be quite easy to prove if they
exist. 7  Actual damages are compensatory damages that are
available whenever an actual injury can be proven.58 It is more
difficult to prove actual injury and receive actual damages than to
prove a violation of one of TILA's many disclosure
requirements. 9
For several reasons, Truth in Lending Act (TILA)
class action suits generally focus on statutory
damages. First, statutory damages are automatic.
They do not require the often difficult-to-obtain
evidence of actual reliance, proximate causation,
actual injury or measurable quantification of loss.
Secondly, actual damage claims often involve
individualized proof, which highlights the unique
aspects of a host of transactions for which class
action plaintiffs want to establish an element of
commonality. Finally, a focus on actual damages
may place the plaintiff-the purported
53. Id.
54. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(1)-(2) (2001).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2); Payday Check Advance, Inc., 202 F.3d at 990-91.
56. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(i).
57. Lynch, supra note 26, at 38.
58. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(1); Payday Check Advance, Inc., 202 F.3d at 990.
59. See Kelley & Ropiequet, supra note 45, at 200.
20031
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representative of a potentially huge class-under a
microscope which reveals inadequacy to represent a
large group of others.6 °
Many cases brought against payday lenders are class actions, a
common trait of suits brought against lenders who affect a large
group of consumers.6' If a consumer decides not to attempt the
difficult task of proving actual damages, her only alternative under
TILA is statutory damages. 6' However, some jurisdictions limit
statutory damages to only certain violations of TILA.63 This can
effectively leave the plaintiff without a remedy if she is unable to
prove actual damages.
III. THE COURTS' INTERPRETATIONS OF THE AVAILABILITY
OF STATUTORY DAMAGES UNDER THE
TRUTH IN LENDING ACT
A. The Pertinent Provisions of TILA
Section 1640(a) of TILA controls the availability of
statutory damages by providing a list of disclosure violations that
trigger statutory damages.64 Section 1640(a) indicates that these
are the "only" violations that can be compensated by statutory
damages. 65 However, there is a split among the courts whether this
restrictive language of section 1640(a) controls all of TILA or only
section 1638 of TILA, which provides a list of disclosure
60. Id.
61. See, e.g., Kilbourn v. Candy Ford-Mercury, Inc., 209 F.R.D. 121 (W.D. Mich.
2002) (regarding a class action against a financier of automobiles).
62. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(1)-(2).
63. See Kelley & Ropiequet, supra note 45, at 200-01; see infra notes 69-83 and
accompanying text (exploring the split among the courts on the issue of statutory
damages).
64. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a). The pertinent section of 1640(a) reads as follows:
"In connection with the disclosures referred to in section 1638 of
this title, a creditor shall have a liability determined under
paragraph (2) only for failing to comply with the requirements of
section 1635 of this title or of paragraph (2) (insofar as it requires a
disclosure of the 'amount financed'), (3), (4), (5), (6), or (9) of





violations.66 If section 1640(a) applies to all of TILA, then it
provides an exhaustive list of violations compensable by statutory
damages.67 If section 1640(a) only applies to section 1638, then the
remainder of TILA is unaffected and courts may interpret whether
these remaining statutes allow for statutory damages.
68
B. The Split Among the Courts over the Interpretation of TILA
Brown v. Payday Check Advance was the first case to
address the issue of statutory damages in the context of payday
loans.69 The Payday Check Advance court found that statutory
damages existed only for violations of the paragraphs enumerated
by section 1640(a).7 ° To arrive at this conclusion, the court in
Payday Check Advance interpreted section 1640(a) as applying to
and limiting all of Part B of TILA instead of only applying to
section 1638(a).71 The court based its reasoning on a portion of
Section 1640(a) providing that it encompasses statutes "under this
p art.
'72
The court next pointed to the language in section 1640(a)
that indicated that the enumerated paragraphs are intended to be
an exclusive list of violations providing for statutory damages.73
66. Compare Kilbourn, 209 F.R.D. at 126-28 (restricting statutory damages under
TILA to those listed by section 1640(a)) with Lozada v. Dale Baker Oldsmobile, Inc.,
145 F. Supp. 2d 878 (W.D. Mich. 2001) (allowing statutory damages for most sections
of TILA).
67. Kilbourn, 209 F.R.D. at 127-28 (restricting statutory damages under TILA to
those listed by section 1640(a))
68. Lozada, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 886 (allowing statutory damages for most sections
of TILA).
69. Brown v. Payday Check Advance, Inc., 202 F.3d 987 (7th Cir. 2000). Payday
Check Advance became such an important case on the availability of statutory
damages simply because it was the first case to rule on the issue. See Kelley &
Ropiequet, supra note 45, at 201. "This limitation on statutory damages was little
explored until the Seventh Circuit took a close look at it in Brown v. Payday Check
Advance, Inc." Id.
70. Payday Check Advance, Inc., 202 F.3d at 991 (finding for statutory damages
only when one of the disclosure requirements enumerated by section 1640 of TILA
was violated).
71. Id. at 990-91.
72. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (2001)).
73. Id. "[A] creditor shall have a liability determined under paragraph (2) only
for failing to comply with section 1635 of this title or with paragraph (2) ... , (3), (4),
(5), (6), or (9) of section 1638(a) of this title .... 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (2001)
2003] 347
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Since the court held that section 1640(a) applied to all of Part B of
TILA, it reasoned that the disclosure violations listed by section
1640(a) are the only violations of Part B that can be compensated
by statutory damages.7 4 The remainder of the court's reasoning is
based on the legislative intent behind TILA.75
Lozada v. Dale Baker Oldsmobile is the case that most
extensively and directly disagrees with the holding in Payday
Check Advance.76  The Lozada court read section 1640 as
establishing a presumption in favor of statutory damages "unless
otherwise excepted."" However, it disagreed with Payday Check
Advance by holding that section 1640 "provides a limitation on
statutory damages only .... within the listed subsections., 78  In
other words, the Lozada court viewed section 1640(a) as only
limiting sections 1635 and 1638 and not applying to the remainder
of Part B of TILA.79 The court used examples to illustrate its view:
Violations of sections [of Part B] not mentioned [by
section 1640] remain subject to statutory damages
under the general provision. For example, violations
of §§ 1631 (Disclosure requirements), 1632 (Form of
disclosure), and 1639 (Requirements for certain
mortgages) all place requirements on creditors but
are not specifically mentioned in § 1640(a). No basis
exists for concluding that these unmentioned
sections are excluded from the presumptive
language of § 1640(a) authorizing statutory
damages.8 °
(emphasis added).
74. Payday Check Advance, Inc., 202 F.3d at 990-91.
75. See infra notes 84-98 and accompanying text (exploring the courts' use of
legislative intent).
76. Lozada v. Dale Baker Oldsmobile, Inc., 145 F. Supp. 2d 878, 885-86 (W.D.
Mich. 2001) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (2001)). The Lozada opinion contains several
paragraphs that argue against the holding in Payday Check Advance. Id. at 886-89.
The Lozada court was very direct in expressing its disagreement with the Seventh
Circuit decision. Id. at 888, 889.
77. Id. at 886. In holding for a presumption in favor of statutory damages, the
court did not agree with the findings of Payday Check Advance. Id. at 886-87.
78. Id. at 887.




The Lozada court also used the consequences of the
opposing view of the Seventh Circuit to illustrate why it is
inaccurate:
Moreover, reading the exception [in section 1640] as
an enumerated and exclusive list of provisions...
would read an odd conflict into Congress' treatment
of § 1639. Section 1640(a)(4) considers violations of
§ 1639 so severe as to warrant recovery of damages
in the amount of all finance charges and fees paid by
the customer - damages available for violations of
no other section .... Yet adopting the reasoning of
the Seventh Circuit would require this court to
consider that Congress had concluded that a
violation of § 1639 was merely a "picky and
inconsequential formal error" intended by Congress
to be excluded from statutory damages.81
Finally, the court argued that the limiting language in
section 1640 should not apply to all of Part B of TILA because
section 1640 only addresses disclosure violations. 8' The court
noted that "TILA does not encompass only disclosure
requirements. Instead, it requires certain disclosures, prohibits
certain kinds of charges, and addresses the form and timing in
which disclosures are made. As a result, the word 'disclosures' is
not a comprehensive description of all types of potential violations
of TILA generally.,
83
C. Arguments in Support of the Competing Views Among the
Courts
The courts find the legislative purpose of TILA to be very
important in deciding how to apply it to specific circumstances.84
81. Id. (quoting Brown v. Payday Check Advance, Inc., 202 F.3d 987, 991 (7th
Cir. 2000)).
82. Lozada, 145 F.Supp.2d at 887,888.
83. Id. at 888.
84. See, e.g., Kilbourn v. Candy Ford-Mercury, Inc., 209 F.R.D. 121,127-28 (W.D.
2003]
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In this context, TILA has been described as a "remedial statute [so
that] .... the court is to give liberal construction to the Act in
favor of the consumer., 85  Furthermore, "TILA receives a
hypertechnical reading" that allows courts to find violations by
lenders if they do not comport with the exact letter of the statute.
86
The two leading payday loan cases on the availability of
statutory damages under TILA, Payday Check Advance and
Lozada, strongly rely on legislative intent to establish their
positions.s7 In general, the courts' penchant for interpreting TILA
in favor of consumers supports the view of Lozada, allowing
consumers more opportunities to receive statutory damages.88
Since statutory damages are easier to prove than actual damages,
construing TILA for the availability of statutory damages will
benefit consumers. 89 The Lozada court also argued that "[t]he
excepting language [of section 1640(a)] does not stand alone and
may not be given preeminence over the general provision." 90
"Exceptions to broad statutory language must be narrowly, not
broadly, construed to avoid undermining the operation of the
general principle."9'
The Payday Check Advance case,92 holding for limited
availability of statutory damages, finds legislative intent to support
it as well. 9' The court argued that statutory damages should not
arise from "picky and inconsequential formal errors," because
Congress did not intend for such small errors to trigger statutory
damages.94 This argument has support from other jurisdictions
Mich. 2002) (referring repeatedly to the legislative intent behind TILA when
explaining the court's holdings).
85. Kilbourn, 209 F.R.D. at 124.
86. Brown v. Payday Check Advance, Inc., 202 F.3d 987, 989 (7th Cir. 2000)
(citing Smith v. No. 2 Galesburg Crown Fin. Corp., 615 F.2d 407, 417 (7th Cir. 1980)).
87. Id. at 991; Lozada, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 888-89 (W.D. Mich. 2001).
88. Lozada, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 888-89 (W.D. Mich. 2001).
89. See Kelley & Ropiequet, supra note 45, at 200.
90. Lozada, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 886 (citing Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S.
153 (1985); United States v. First City Nat. Bank of Houston, 386 U.S. 361 (1967)).
91. Id.
92. Payday Check Advance, Inc., 202 F.3d at 992.
93. Id. at 991.
94. Id. at 991. The Payday Check Advance case makes a strong point about
legislative intent behind TILA. Id. Many plaintiffs suing payday lenders are using
"picky and inconsequential formal errors" to get their cases in court since actual
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because amendments made to TILA in 1980 "were intended to
reduce the scope of creditor liability to violations which are central
to understanding a credit transaction's costs and terms."95  The
court in Kilbourn continued with a more direct attack on Lozada:
"Reading the limiting provisions of § 1640 as the court did in
Lozada would permit the recovery of statutory damages for
violations of 'technical' requirements, which is what Congress
intended to eliminate.,
96
The Seventh Circuit in Payday Check Advance also argued
that it was limited by legislative intent because it could only go by
the statutes that Congress had enacted: "Whether Congress should
have included it, or would have done so had it thought more fully,
does not affect interpretation of the law it actually enacted....
[e]ven if its omission is a legislative oversight."9' Finally, the court
made the direct argument that Congress had written down what it
intended in clear language and that the court should not try to
subvert what Congress had written through a strained construction
of the statutes.98
IV. CONCLUSION
Payday lending is a practice that is quickly moving from the
"fringe" credit market into a more broadly accepted practice by
banks and credit unions. 99 As the number of people patronizing
damages can be difficult to prove. Id.
95. S. REP. No. 96-73, at 7, 17 (1979); Kilbourn v. Candy Ford-Mercury, Inc., 209
F.R.D. 121,127 (W.D. Mich. 2002).
96. Kilbourn, 209 F.R.D. at 128 (citing Payday Check Advance, 202 F.3d at 991-
92).
97. Payday Check Advance, Inc., 202 F.3d at 992 (citing West Virginia University
Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 100-01 (1991); In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340 (7th
Cir. 1989).
98. Id. at 991.
99. See Hackett, supra note 5, at 48.
Today .... 'subprime lending' has become the rage among many
of the nation's banks. Now, a growing number of banks are
pushing the ethical envelope even further, moving down the chain,
even below the level of the pawnshop. They are adopting
variations of so-called payday lending, characterized by loans of
short duration and extraordinarily high annual rates - at times
more than 400%.
2003]
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payday lenders continues to increase,'0° it will be increasingly
important that the courts provide relief to borrowers who have
been injured by short-term lenders. The most effective remedy
available to borrowers is to request statutory damages under
section 1640 of TILA. 10
Of the competing theories on how to approach the
availability of statutory damages for disclosure violations, the
Seventh Circuit in Payday Check Advance"°2 offered the view that
seems to comport with Congress's intent when it passed the 1980
Amendments to TILA10 3 While the issue is still relatively novel" °n
the available case law seems to support the approach that the
Seventh Circuit has proffered." 5 Of course, the downside of this
construction is that statutory damages for borrowers from payday
lenders will be limited to the seven subsections listed by section
1640. In light of this situation, the best approach may be to lobby
Congress to amend TILA to offer more opportunities for
borrowers to have access to statutory damages.
°6
THOMAS A. WILSON
100. Lynch, supra note 26, at 38. "The best estimates peg the short-term loan
industry as growing from a few hundred stores at the start of the last decade to
roughly 10,000 today, lending nearly $14 billion a year." Id.
101. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2) (2001).
102. Payday Check Advance, Inc., 202 F.3d at 992.
103. S. REP. No. 96-73, at 7, 17 (1979).
104. Kelley & Ropiequet, supra note 45, at 201. "This limitation on statutory
damages was little explored until the Seventh Circuit took a close look at it in Brown
v. Payday Check Advance, Inc." Id.
105. See, e.g., Kilbourn v. Candy Ford-Mercury, Inc., 209 F.R.D. 121 (W.D. Mich.
2002).
106. The court in Payday Check Advance seemed to hint at this approach when it
mentioned that a court is unable to go against legislative intent. Payday Check
Advance, Inc., 202 F.3d at 992 (citing West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v.
Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 100-01 (1991); In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340 (7th Cir. 1989)).
"Whether Congress should have included it, or would have done so had it thought
more fully, does not affect interpretation of the law it actually enacted.... [e]ven if
its omission is a legislative oversight." Id.
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